Apparently China is to blame for the complete shambles that was the Copenhagen agreement.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/22/copenhagen-climate-change-mark-lynas
They are, of course, denying this - http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/8425720.stm - and who really knows what happened bar people who were there, but it's a worrying thought that self-interest could have hampered the most crucial discussions of our lifetime.
Wednesday, 23 December 2009
Tuesday, 3 November 2009
Lamy on Copenhagen and other Stories
Dear all,
Worth noting that the D-G of the WTO has posted a warning to... well, the world I guess, about the upcoming Copenhagen conference on Climate Change.
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl140_e.htm
An interesting read.
Also worth noting that the EU has agreed among itself that it will offer a 95% reduction in emissions by 2050 and 30% by 2020 if a substantive deal can be reached with other countries (the USA, China, India, etc.). Further, the EU will pay "its fair share" of the estimated £90bn required to help developing countries deal with the ramifications of climate change.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/oct/21/europe-carbon-emissions
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/8334146.stm
Is this genuine leadership at last? Jose Manuel Barroso says "[the EU] can look the others in the eye", but I suspect that they have failed to address one of the pressing issues, which is that any agreement seems to hinge on others at least making a similar commitment to the offer made by the EU.
Why should the EU be dependent on other countries to make its own commitments? Only a desire not to lose face or competitive advantage against those who seem reluctant to drive forward their own domestic environmental agendas. While this may be understandable from an economist's perspective, would Barroso be willing to look future generations in the eye when he explains, weakly, with his cheeks further reddening as every syllable passes his lips, "sorry, we didn't do everything in our power to address climate change because other countries wouldn't do it too". Clearly the EU has either a) acknowledged that a 95% reduction in 40 years is achievable, in which case that commitment should be made irrespective of the position of other nations; or b) they have set a target which is so unpalatable to other nations that they know they will never be held to it - yet when the dust settles on a fruitless Copenhagen, the soundbites will be prepared and the blame apportioned elsewhere.
Either way, games are being played.
Worth noting that the D-G of the WTO has posted a warning to... well, the world I guess, about the upcoming Copenhagen conference on Climate Change.
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl140_e.htm
An interesting read.
Also worth noting that the EU has agreed among itself that it will offer a 95% reduction in emissions by 2050 and 30% by 2020 if a substantive deal can be reached with other countries (the USA, China, India, etc.). Further, the EU will pay "its fair share" of the estimated £90bn required to help developing countries deal with the ramifications of climate change.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/oct/21/europe-carbon-emissions
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/8334146.stm
Is this genuine leadership at last? Jose Manuel Barroso says "[the EU] can look the others in the eye", but I suspect that they have failed to address one of the pressing issues, which is that any agreement seems to hinge on others at least making a similar commitment to the offer made by the EU.
Why should the EU be dependent on other countries to make its own commitments? Only a desire not to lose face or competitive advantage against those who seem reluctant to drive forward their own domestic environmental agendas. While this may be understandable from an economist's perspective, would Barroso be willing to look future generations in the eye when he explains, weakly, with his cheeks further reddening as every syllable passes his lips, "sorry, we didn't do everything in our power to address climate change because other countries wouldn't do it too". Clearly the EU has either a) acknowledged that a 95% reduction in 40 years is achievable, in which case that commitment should be made irrespective of the position of other nations; or b) they have set a target which is so unpalatable to other nations that they know they will never be held to it - yet when the dust settles on a fruitless Copenhagen, the soundbites will be prepared and the blame apportioned elsewhere.
Either way, games are being played.
Friday, 23 October 2009
D'Amato on Intra-Generational Responsibility
Did anyone look at D'Amato's article on intra-generational responsibility for IEL Seminar 2? (If not, you can read it here http://anthonydamato.law.northwestern.edu/Adobefiles/a90c-duty.pdf)
It's quite an interesting read, and appealed to me a bit because there are sort-of philisophical/jurisprudential undertones.
Anyway, quick summary. The theory of intra-generational responsibility is, as I see it, that the present generation has a responsibility to ensure that future generations have at least the same quality of environment as is presently possessed (although possession is the wrong word, it's more stewardship than ownership, but I digress). This is one of the key concepts behind the principle of sustainable development.
D'Amato's paper discusses an article by a Derek Parfit (Parfit, On Doing the Best for Our Children, in ETHICS AND POPULATION 100 (M. Bayles ed. 1976); Parfit, Overpopulation: Part One (ms. 1976), referred to in Parfit, Future Generations, Further Problems, 11 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 113 (1982)) in which the idea is espoused that by doing anything in the interests of protecting a specific future generation (the example given is the generation in existence 100 years from now) we are likely to change exactly who that generation will be: our actions are likely to ensure that for any human procreation after our helpful act takes place, a different sperm will fertilise the egg than would have done had we not carried out the act. How, then, can we be said to be acting in a generation's best interests when our actions are likely to leave that generation marooned in the ether?
I don't find myself compelled by this argument, to be honest. It seemed clear to me from the outset that the principle of intra-generational responsibility was not a duty owed to any specific person, rather that it could be summarised thus:
If we are to assume that in 100 years, human beings continue to live on Planet Earth, and if we are to assume that they will be broadly similar in appearance, desires, emotions, needs etc. to the humans who currently live on Planet Earth, we owe a responsibility to ensure that the needs of that generation can be met.
It is not a duty to any specific future persons, but is a less-clearly-defined general duty that we should not be living an "opulent" lifestyle (as Weiss would have it) at the expense of people who in the future may find that the strains on natural resources are greater than they are presently.
D'Amato seems willing to dismiss this perspective (forgive the long quote).
"But the argument, upon inspection, simply glosses over the problem. Future generations are not an abstraction; they consist of individuals. The particularity of the individuals is apparent when we consider how lucky it is for anyone to be born. The odds of your being born instead of one of your many potential siblings are comparable to the odds of winning the Pennsylvania Lottery in the recent drawing when the first prize was over $100 million. The point is that
the winner of the lottery would not be equally content to have any other person win the lottery; similarly, you and I would not be content if a different person had been born instead of us. We may have been lucky to have been born at all, but we are not ready to relinquish that luck simply on the ground that large numbers and vanishingly small probabilities are involved. The fact that somebody will be born does not mean that the person lucky enough to be born is indifferent about who it is. Future generations cannot be indifferent about whether it is they or other persons who will enjoy the fruits of the earth. If we feel we owe an obligation to them, we, too, cannot be indifferent about the question. We cannot discharge our obligation to them if in the process of doing so we deprive them of life."
To refute D'Amato's reasoning, I suggest the following ideas:
(1) It is not denied that there will be particular individuals born in the future, and D'Amato seems to be suggesting that but for our actions in the present, specific individuals would be born who now will not be. This is probably correct (not being a scientist, frankly I have no idea!), but the same could be said for a number of situations - but for the father drinking water rather than beer on the morning of the day of a conception, one sperm may have fertilised the egg rather than another... it is not a case that only one action changes the outcome, the sheer randomness (randomity?) of life means that which sperm fertilises an egg is a complete lottery influenced by more than mere physics or gravity, but potentially by any single thing that happens in ones' parents' lifetimes - potentially grandparents' or great-grandparents' too.
(2) D'Amato seems to be imposing a consciousness on a person who will never exist by suggesting that such person would not be happy to have never existed. Surely the principle to stick to is that at least someone is being born at all? If you have never existed, you do not much care about that fact. At least in my experience as an intangible possibility floating through the great realm of "what-if".
(3) I can't help feeling that to some extent in dealing with Parfit's Paradox, D'Amato has rather missed the point. I personally feel that I would be utterly, infitely "indifferent" about having never existed - having never existed I could not experience such startling emotions as indifference in the first place.
Yet in the last few pages or so, D'Amato appears ready to make his key statement - that rather than feeling beholden to a future generation we will inadvertently destroy anyway, we should just act reasonably and sensibly in utilising our resources through a sense of natural obligation. This is a brilliant, but ultimately Utopian statement. The world, generally, spins on an axis of self-interest. Environmental treaties are watered down and weakened because of petty squabbling over who did what in the past. Climate Change has been an issue for at least 15 years, and a pressing one for the last five at least, and national and international leadership is dominated by headline-grabbing soundbites of little substance. Yet when the economy begins to decline, concerted international effort is arranged over a period of months and all the stops are pulled out. This leads me to the rather sad conclusion that there is no such sense of natural obligation - at least in a national or governmental sense. Politicians need votes to maintain their positions, and votes are won by ensuring growth, money in voters' pockets.
So I return to the idea that we owe a duty to a future generation, whomsoever shall make that generation up. While it would be jolly nice to assume that everyone would do the right thing because it is the right thing, the evidence does not suggest this assumption is well-founded. This troubled ocean we traverse has no markers on the horizon, nothing to keep us heading in any particular direction. Perhaps knowing that a future generation will judge us on our actions is the landmark we need to return to safer shores?
It's quite an interesting read, and appealed to me a bit because there are sort-of philisophical/jurisprudential undertones.
Anyway, quick summary. The theory of intra-generational responsibility is, as I see it, that the present generation has a responsibility to ensure that future generations have at least the same quality of environment as is presently possessed (although possession is the wrong word, it's more stewardship than ownership, but I digress). This is one of the key concepts behind the principle of sustainable development.
D'Amato's paper discusses an article by a Derek Parfit (Parfit, On Doing the Best for Our Children, in ETHICS AND POPULATION 100 (M. Bayles ed. 1976); Parfit, Overpopulation: Part One (ms. 1976), referred to in Parfit, Future Generations, Further Problems, 11 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 113 (1982)) in which the idea is espoused that by doing anything in the interests of protecting a specific future generation (the example given is the generation in existence 100 years from now) we are likely to change exactly who that generation will be: our actions are likely to ensure that for any human procreation after our helpful act takes place, a different sperm will fertilise the egg than would have done had we not carried out the act. How, then, can we be said to be acting in a generation's best interests when our actions are likely to leave that generation marooned in the ether?
I don't find myself compelled by this argument, to be honest. It seemed clear to me from the outset that the principle of intra-generational responsibility was not a duty owed to any specific person, rather that it could be summarised thus:
If we are to assume that in 100 years, human beings continue to live on Planet Earth, and if we are to assume that they will be broadly similar in appearance, desires, emotions, needs etc. to the humans who currently live on Planet Earth, we owe a responsibility to ensure that the needs of that generation can be met.
It is not a duty to any specific future persons, but is a less-clearly-defined general duty that we should not be living an "opulent" lifestyle (as Weiss would have it) at the expense of people who in the future may find that the strains on natural resources are greater than they are presently.
D'Amato seems willing to dismiss this perspective (forgive the long quote).
"But the argument, upon inspection, simply glosses over the problem. Future generations are not an abstraction; they consist of individuals. The particularity of the individuals is apparent when we consider how lucky it is for anyone to be born. The odds of your being born instead of one of your many potential siblings are comparable to the odds of winning the Pennsylvania Lottery in the recent drawing when the first prize was over $100 million. The point is that
the winner of the lottery would not be equally content to have any other person win the lottery; similarly, you and I would not be content if a different person had been born instead of us. We may have been lucky to have been born at all, but we are not ready to relinquish that luck simply on the ground that large numbers and vanishingly small probabilities are involved. The fact that somebody will be born does not mean that the person lucky enough to be born is indifferent about who it is. Future generations cannot be indifferent about whether it is they or other persons who will enjoy the fruits of the earth. If we feel we owe an obligation to them, we, too, cannot be indifferent about the question. We cannot discharge our obligation to them if in the process of doing so we deprive them of life."
To refute D'Amato's reasoning, I suggest the following ideas:
(1) It is not denied that there will be particular individuals born in the future, and D'Amato seems to be suggesting that but for our actions in the present, specific individuals would be born who now will not be. This is probably correct (not being a scientist, frankly I have no idea!), but the same could be said for a number of situations - but for the father drinking water rather than beer on the morning of the day of a conception, one sperm may have fertilised the egg rather than another... it is not a case that only one action changes the outcome, the sheer randomness (randomity?) of life means that which sperm fertilises an egg is a complete lottery influenced by more than mere physics or gravity, but potentially by any single thing that happens in ones' parents' lifetimes - potentially grandparents' or great-grandparents' too.
(2) D'Amato seems to be imposing a consciousness on a person who will never exist by suggesting that such person would not be happy to have never existed. Surely the principle to stick to is that at least someone is being born at all? If you have never existed, you do not much care about that fact. At least in my experience as an intangible possibility floating through the great realm of "what-if".
(3) I can't help feeling that to some extent in dealing with Parfit's Paradox, D'Amato has rather missed the point. I personally feel that I would be utterly, infitely "indifferent" about having never existed - having never existed I could not experience such startling emotions as indifference in the first place.
Yet in the last few pages or so, D'Amato appears ready to make his key statement - that rather than feeling beholden to a future generation we will inadvertently destroy anyway, we should just act reasonably and sensibly in utilising our resources through a sense of natural obligation. This is a brilliant, but ultimately Utopian statement. The world, generally, spins on an axis of self-interest. Environmental treaties are watered down and weakened because of petty squabbling over who did what in the past. Climate Change has been an issue for at least 15 years, and a pressing one for the last five at least, and national and international leadership is dominated by headline-grabbing soundbites of little substance. Yet when the economy begins to decline, concerted international effort is arranged over a period of months and all the stops are pulled out. This leads me to the rather sad conclusion that there is no such sense of natural obligation - at least in a national or governmental sense. Politicians need votes to maintain their positions, and votes are won by ensuring growth, money in voters' pockets.
So I return to the idea that we owe a duty to a future generation, whomsoever shall make that generation up. While it would be jolly nice to assume that everyone would do the right thing because it is the right thing, the evidence does not suggest this assumption is well-founded. This troubled ocean we traverse has no markers on the horizon, nothing to keep us heading in any particular direction. Perhaps knowing that a future generation will judge us on our actions is the landmark we need to return to safer shores?
Thursday, 15 October 2009
So, yeah...
Quite a strange concept this, using a blog as a means of documenting/assisting with legal research. Not really sure what to make of it. To go all Myspace for a minute, let's say my mood is "interested in seeing how this all works" - bit wordier that normal for Myspace I guess.
Anyway, legal research.
I've done quite a bit of the aforesaid in the past. I was an active Mooter at Glasgow Caledonian, which required quite a lot of digging around into obscure contract/delict issues. I've carried out a variety of courseworks on different undergrad issues, where my favourites have been an essay on the development of Sale of Goods legislation in Scotland and a report on the decline of Swietenia Macrophylla (mahogany) in South America and the legal frameworks put in place to protect it.
I did my undergrad dissertation (12,500 words approx) on the postal rule in contract law, which I find to be quite a quaint throwback to simpler times, alas less relevant nowadays. Technology marches on, etc.
I'm going to bung each of these courseworks up on SSRN once I've registered, just for giggles.
So far with the LLM I've been studying more than researching. Only have word of one coursework so far, which is 500 words on "what I think about nuclear power" - designed to be a light-hearted introduction to the topic - for Energy Resources and Policy. It doesn't need to be particularly balanced or well thought out apparently, so I'm gearing up for a 500 word rant about why we are playing with fire. Green, glowing, radioactive fire.
We've been studying the origins of the WTO, the treaty basis of International Environmental Law, and on Tuesday 70 of us spent two hours being told about tidal barrage systems, etc. Then we have Research Methods, which has prompted this blog in the first place.
Sy, yeah... it's been really interesting so far, and I'm glad I decided to go to Strathclyde. The things I'm learning now will have a lot more practical applicability than most of the undergrad stuff I did (tax law, snore...).
P
Anyway, legal research.
I've done quite a bit of the aforesaid in the past. I was an active Mooter at Glasgow Caledonian, which required quite a lot of digging around into obscure contract/delict issues. I've carried out a variety of courseworks on different undergrad issues, where my favourites have been an essay on the development of Sale of Goods legislation in Scotland and a report on the decline of Swietenia Macrophylla (mahogany) in South America and the legal frameworks put in place to protect it.
I did my undergrad dissertation (12,500 words approx) on the postal rule in contract law, which I find to be quite a quaint throwback to simpler times, alas less relevant nowadays. Technology marches on, etc.
I'm going to bung each of these courseworks up on SSRN once I've registered, just for giggles.
So far with the LLM I've been studying more than researching. Only have word of one coursework so far, which is 500 words on "what I think about nuclear power" - designed to be a light-hearted introduction to the topic - for Energy Resources and Policy. It doesn't need to be particularly balanced or well thought out apparently, so I'm gearing up for a 500 word rant about why we are playing with fire. Green, glowing, radioactive fire.
We've been studying the origins of the WTO, the treaty basis of International Environmental Law, and on Tuesday 70 of us spent two hours being told about tidal barrage systems, etc. Then we have Research Methods, which has prompted this blog in the first place.
Sy, yeah... it's been really interesting so far, and I'm glad I decided to go to Strathclyde. The things I'm learning now will have a lot more practical applicability than most of the undergrad stuff I did (tax law, snore...).
P
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